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Abstract 
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) provide low-income people with matches for 
savings used for home purchase, post-secondary education, or microenterprise. Match 
rates for the 2,350 IDA participants in the American Dream Demonstration (ADD) 
were typically 1:1 or 2:1 but ranged as high as 7:1. This paper looks at how these match 
rates were related with the likelihood of saving something and with the level of savings. 
The model controls for a number of confounding factors often ignored in similar studies 
of match rates in 401(k) plans. For IDAs in ADD, higher match rates were generally 
associated with a greater likelihood of saving something and—for participants who 
saved something—a lower level of IDA savings. 
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1. Introduction 
Individual Development Accounts provide low-income people with matches for savings 
used for home purchase, post-secondary education, or small business. IDAs have three 
goals: to include the poor in asset-building policies, to increase their savings, and to 
increase their asset accumulation (savings plus match). 
 
The worldwide policy shift away from income support and toward asset-building may 
leave the poor behind (Sherraden, 1997). For example, the U.S. government spends 
billions each year on tax breaks for asset-building in Individual Retirement Accounts, 
401(k) plans, and deductions for home-mortgage interest (Howard, 1997). Tax breaks, 
however, are worth little to people in low tax brackets, so direct matching via IDAs is 
one of the few ways to include low-income people in asset-building policies. 
 
IDAs also aim to increase savings by low-income people. As income and consumption 
decrease, the opportunity cost of saving increases. Matching in IDAs boosts the return 
to saving to help compensate for the short-term sacrifice. 
 
Finally, IDAs aim to increase asset accumulation. Matching turns a given level of 
savings into a larger amount of asset accumulation, sometimes enough to acquire a life-
changing asset such as a house or a college education. 
 
How do match rates affect savings by low-income people in IDAs? Matching is central 
to IDAs, yet very little is known about how people—poor or not—respond to match 
rates. The assessment of match-rate effects—whether for the poor in IDAs or the non-
poor in 401(k) plans—is complex for several reasons. 
 
First, matching sharpens a kink in the budget constraint, so how match rates affect 
whether something is saved may differ—even in sign—from how match rates affect the 
level of savings (Moffitt, 1990). Economic theory unambiguously predicts that higher 
match rates will increase the likelihood of saving something, and this accords with most 
participant-level evidence in the 401(k) literature (Clark, et al., 2000; Clark and 
Schieber, 1998; General Accounting Office, 1997). But for the level of savings, theory is 
ambiguous. Higher returns to saving—that is, higher match rates—increase the cost of 
current consumption relative to future consumption. The resulting “substitution effect” 
tends to increase saving. But higher match rates also allow a household to save less and 
still reach a given goal. This “fixed-target” effect tends to depress saving. 
 
Second, the level of matchable IDA savings is capped. Thus, desired savings are 
observed only if they are below the cap. Furthermore, higher match rates in IDAs—as 
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in 401(k) plans (VanDerhei and Copeland, 2001)—are associated with lower caps. This 
means that even if higher match rates increase desired IDA savings, observed savings 
may be lower with higher match rates (and lower caps) than with lower match rates 
(and higher caps). Failure to adjust for censoring at the match cap biases estimates of 
match-rate effects downwards. Most participant-level studies of match rates in 401(k) 
plans do not adjust for censoring, and they usually find (perhaps spuriously) that 
higher match rates are linked with lower levels of savings as a percentage of income 
(Munnell, Sundén, and Taylor, 2002; VanDerhei and Copeland, 2001; Clark et al., 2000; 
Andrews, 1992). In contrast, most specifications in the only papers to adjust for 
censoring (Engelhardt and Kumar, 2003; Cunningham and Engelhardt, 2002) find that 
higher match rates are associated with higher savings. 
 
Third, unobserved participant characteristics may affect the response to match rates. In 
particular, people with high “propensities to save” may respond more strongly to higher 
match rates. This biases estimates of match-rate effects upwards. In the match-rate 
literature for 401(k) plans, only Engelhardt and Kumar (2003) and Cunningham and 
Engelhardt (2002) control for participant heterogeneity. 
 
Fourth, IDA programs who expect participants to find it particularly difficult to save 
may try to compensate by setting higher match rates. In effect, they adjust the match 
rate based on participant characteristics that they observe but that the researcher does 
not. Failure to account for this program heterogeneity biases estimates of match-rate 
effects downwards. No known papers control for this. There may also be other sources 
of program heterogeneity. For example, all IDA programs examined here required that 
participants attend financial education, but class quality was both varied and 
unobserved. The strictness of rule enforcement was also varied and unobserved. 
 
The econometric technique here is unique in the match-rate literature in that it 
accounts for these four sources of bias. It allows distinct match-rate effects for the 
choice to save something and for the level of IDA savings. It uses a Tobit to control for 
censoring, and it uses fixed effects to control for program heterogeneity. Finally, it 
controls for participant heterogeneity via a Heckman-type selection term and—more 
importantly—by including a large range of participant characteristics as regressors. 
 
The model is applied to the 2,350 IDA participants in the 14 programs of the American 
Dream Demonstration. Match rates were typically 1:1 or 2:1 but ranged as high as 7:1, 
and they varied not only between programs but also within programs. 
 
In accord with theory, higher match rates were associated with a greater likelihood of 
saving something. For participants who did save something, the “fixed-goal” effect 
apparently dominated the “substitution effect”, as higher match rates were generally 
associated with a lower level of IDA savings. 
Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis 
3
 
What do these results mean for the three policy goals of IDAs? First, higher match 
rates help include low-income people in asset-building policies. Second, match rates 
above 1:1 may decrease savings. Third, the higher match and the greater likelihood of 
saving something more than compensates for the decrease in savings, so higher match 
rates increase asset accumulation. 
  
Part 2 below describes IDAs and participants in ADD and presents simple cross-tabs 
between match rates and savings outcomes. Part 3 describes the model and its results. 
Part 4 concludes with some implications for policy. 
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2. IDAs and the American Dream Demonstration 
2.1 Assets, development, and the poor 
Development—that is, improvement in well-being—requires saving for the accumulation 
of human, physical, financial, and social capital. Many U.S. policies subsidize saving, 
usually via tax breaks. But tax breaks usually do not benefit for the poor very much. 
 
IDAs aim to include low-income people in asset-building policy and to help them save 
and accumulate assets (Sherraden, 1991). Instead of tax breaks, IDAs provide matches 
for savings used to build human capital (via post-secondary education), physical capital 
(via home purchase), or business capital (via microenterprise). IDA programs also seek 
to build human capital (via financial education) and social capital (via support from 
peers and program staff). 
 
Although the field of development economics has long seen saving as central to long-
term improvement in well-being, public policy in the United States somehow overlooked 
the importance of saving for the poor. Public assistance provided cash to meet 
subsistence requirements, but it stopped short of transfers in the amounts and forms 
that might help people improve their well-being (develop) in the long term. 
 
In 1988, a movement started to include the poor in asset-building policies. Friedman’s 
The Safety Net as Ladder suggested that public assistance could aid development 
beyond mere subsistence. Haveman’s Starting Even argued that “transfer payments are 
necessary but not sufficient” (p. 149). Sherraden’s “Rethinking Social Policy: Towards 
Assets” proposed IDAs as one step toward a development-oriented policy paradigm. 
 
The movement has since gained intellectual momentum (Sherraden and Morris, 
forthcoming; Shapiro and Wolff, 2001; Ackerman and Alstott, 1999; Conley, 1999; 
Oliver and Shapiro, 1995). It has also attracted broad political support. Bill Clinton—
who as governor of Arkansas wrote the foreword to The Safety Net as Ladder—
supported IDAs in his 1992 campaign and later proposed a large matched-savings 
program (Wayne, 1999). In 2000, both George W. Bush and Al Gore had IDA proposals 
in their platforms (Bush, 2000; Kessler, 2000). About 34 states have IDA legislation 
(Edwards and Mason, 2003), and the Assets for Independence Act authorized $250 
million for IDAs in 1999–2009. Furthermore, the Savings for Working Families Act—if 
passed—would provide $450 million for 300,000 IDAs over 10 years. Outside the United 
States, Taiwan has an IDA-like demonstration, and Canada has sponsored a 
randomized IDA experiment. In the United Kingdom, the Savings Gateway resembles 
IDAs (Kempson, McKay, and Collard, 2003), and the new Child Trust Fund will give 
each newborn an account and a deposit, with larger deposits for children in poor 
families (H.M. Treasury, 2003). 
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2.2 The American Dream Demonstration 
The first large-scale IDA project was the American Dream Demonstration. From 1997 
to 2003, ADD had 2,350 participants at 14 IDA programs across the United States. All 
programs provided matches for home purchase, post-secondary education, and small 
business, and some also provided matches for job training, home repair, and retirement 
saving. Unmatched withdrawals were allowed for other purposes. Most programs were 
housed in non-profit community-development organizations. Schreiner et al. (2001) and 
Schreiner, Clancy and Sherraden (2002) give more detail on each program. 
 
ADD participants held their IDAs as passbook accounts in banks or credit unions. 
Deposits received no special tax treatment, but the IRS counted matches as gifts. 
Match monies were not commingled with participant savings, and matches were 
disbursed directly to vendors (for example, a home seller or a college) or to participants 
upon presentation of receipts (for example, small-business investment). Participants had 
to attend financial-education classes. 
 
Program staff in ADD collected data with a software package designed to help them 
manage IDAs (Johnson, Hinterlong, and Sherraden, 2001). The system recorded 
account-structure parameters at start-up, participant demographic and economic data 
at enrollment, and IDA cash flows in each month. The cash-flow data are accurate and 
complete; they come from bank records and satisfy accounting identities. Participant 
data ware extensively cross-checked, and program parameters were double-checked. 
While the ADD data are not perfect, they are unusually clean, and these may be the 
only high-frequency data on matched savings by low-income people. 
 
2.2.1 Participants in ADD 
People with household income under 200 percent of poverty were eligible to participate 
in ADD. For participants, average monthly household income was about $1,400, and 
median income/poverty (controlling for household size) was 107 percent. The sum of 
passbook and checking balances averaged about $500. 
 
At enrollment, 16 percent of participants owned a home, 60 percent owned a car, and 
18 percent reported small-business assets or self-employment income. Almost half (48 
percent) intended to make a matched withdrawal for home purchase, 19 percent for 
small business, 16 percent for post-secondary education, and 17 percent for home repair, 
retirement saving, or job training. 
 
Compared to low-income people in general, participants in ADD were more 
disadvantaged in that they were disproportionately female (80 percent), African-
American (47 percent), and/or not married (about 75 percent) (Sherraden et al., 2000). 
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About 44 percent were single mothers, and 50 percent had received public assistance at 
some point before enrollment. Participants were disproportionately advantaged in that 
they were more likely at enrollment to be employed or to be students (90 percent), to 
have a college degree (24 percent), and/or to own a bank account (77 percent). 
 
The ADD data cover participants, that is, low-income people who could choose to open 
an IDA and who did so. The data do not cover eligibles, those people who could have 
opened an IDA but who chose not to. Participants likely differ from eligibles. In 
particular, if both eligibles and actual participants had opened IDAs, the actual 
participants probably would have had better savings outcomes, as they were drawn 
more heavily from those who expected—based on their knowledge of their own 
characteristics—large rewards from IDA participation. While it is useful to know how 
participants behaved, for many policy purposes it is more useful to know how eligibles 
would have behaved. 
 
Participants in ADD were not only self-selected but also program-selected. IDA 
programs usually targeted specific groups such as the working poor, women, and/or 
people of color. Furthermore, the host organizations often promoted IDAs most among 
people who were already clients of their other services. Program selection could have 
increased or decreased savings for participants (relative to eligibles). 
 
2.2.1 Match rates and savings outcomes in ADD 
Figure 1 relates match rates with savings outcomes. For IDAs in ADD, match rates had 
no clear link with the likelihood of being a “saver”, defined as having at least $100 of 
matchable savings (including matched withdrawals) as of the last day when deposits 
could be matched. About 53 percent of participants were “savers”. Note that “savers” 
refers to participants with at least $100 of matchable savings, not to eligibles who 
opened IDAs. Most “non-savers” saved something for a time but then made unmatched 
withdrawals. 
 
In the cross-tabs for “savers”, higher match rates were associated with lower IDA 
savings. Across match rates of 1:1, 2:1, and above 2:1, matchable savings were $1,357, 
$887, and $739. The percentage of income saved in IDAs was 3.4, 2.4, and 2.3. 
Likewise, “matchable savings per month” was $36.91, $26.67, and $22.07. 
 
The apparent negative link between higher match rates and lower IDA savings in 
Figure 1 may, however, be an artifact of censoring. Programs in ADD tended to couple 
higher match rates with lower match caps: looking at the 1,233 “savers” across match 
rates, the average match cap was $2,060, $1,325, and $917. Furthermore, IDA savings 
for participants with higher match rates (and hence lower match caps) were more likely 
to be censored: while 27 percent of participants with match rates of 1:1 had IDA 
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savings at the match cap, the figure was 44 percent for match rates of 2:1, and 57 
percent for match rates above 2:1. (To allow for what the literature on kinked budget 
constraints calls “optimization error”, participants were counted as “censored” if they 
were within 95 percent of the match cap.) Thus, censoring at the lower match caps that 
were associated with higher match rates may explain the apparently negative match-
rate effect on IDA savings. The model below controls for this. 
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3. Results 
3.1 Econometric model 
The modelling problem has four aspects. First, match rate may have a different effect 
on the likelihood of being a “saver” than on the level of IDA savings. Second, desired 
IDA savings may be censored at the match cap. Third and fourth, match rates may 
interact with unobserved characteristics of programs and participants. 
 
A two-step model accounts for these issues. For all 2,350 participants, the first step is a 
Probit on the likelihood of being a “saver”. For the 1,243 “savers”, the second step is a 
Tobit on “matchable savings per month”. Each step has a distinct match-rate effect. 
The second-step Tobit controls for censoring, and both steps use fixed effects to control 
for program heterogeneity. To control for participant heterogeneity, the Tobit includes a 
Heckman-type selection term. More importantly, both steps include an unusually large 
number of variables, many of them correlated with unobserved factors such as 
“propensity to save”. The idea is to control for unobserved factors by including many 
observed factors that are likely to be correlated with them. 
 
The model can be seen as a variant of Greene’s (2002) Tobit with selection, Amemiya’s 
(1984) “Type II Tobit”, or Cragg’s (1971) two-step Tobit. In the first step, a participant 
is a “saver” (z = 1) if the (unobserved) desired “saver” status z* is positive: 
 
.
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     (1) 
 
For “savers” in the second step, the level of observed IDA savings y equals desired IDA 
savings y* if y* is less than the match cap m. Otherwise, observed IDA savings y equals 
the match cap m. The second step includes the selection term λ: 
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The errors u and ε are joint-normal with parameters (0, 0, 1, σ2, ρ). 
 
Full-information maximum likelihood estimation of (1) and (2) proved difficult. The full 
model has more than 200 regressors, but LIMDEP 8.0 allows only 140. SAS 9.0 has no 
such limits, but its QLIM procedure has a documented bug. In the end, a stripped-down 
full-information model was estimated in LIMDEP, and a limited-information version of 
the full model was estimated in SAS. Match-rate effects were virtually identical in both 
cases, so estimates for the full model are reported here. 
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The final specification omits the selection term λ, as it was always insignificant 
(p>0.95). Although participants who were more likely to be “savers” probably also had 
higher expected IDA savings, the wealth of variables included in both steps apparently 
absorbed this heterogeneity. As one check, the second step was estimated with least-
squares, and adjusted R2 was about 0.46. For a cross-section, individual-level savings 
regression, this is a high level of explanatory power, suggesting that many important 
factors—whether observed directly or not—were controlled for. 
 
3.2 Exogenous variation in match rates 
Before getting to the model’s results, this section addresses two more questions: Was 
there sufficient variation in match rates, and was this variation exogenous? 
 
Match rates in ADD did vary, both between and within programs (Figure 2). Looking 
between programs with 30 or more participants (or “savers”) with a given match rate, 
there were 5 (5) programs with 1:1, 10 (8) programs with 2:1, and 5 (5) programs above 
2:1. Looking within programs, there were 4 (3) programs with 30 or more participants 
with 1:1 match rates and 30 or more participants to 2:1 match rates. There were 2 (1) 
programs with 30 or more participants with 2:1 match rates and 30 or more 
participants above 2:1. In principle, this is sufficient to identify match-rate effects, even 
after controlling for program fixed effects. 
 
Were match rates exogenous? In most cases, programs set match rates independently of 
their beliefs about how participants would save, and the model controls for other cases. 
 
First, match rates were (sub-)program-wide, not participant-specific. Still, if programs 
expected their participants as a group to save less, then they may in some cases have 
set higher match rates at the outset of ADD (Sherraden et al., 2000). Program fixed 
effects, however, should help control for this. 
 
Second, as ADD progressed, some programs assigned different match rates to later 
cohorts. Staff state, however, that these new match rates were driven by the availability 
of match funds rather than beliefs about how later cohorts would save. In any case, the 
model controls indirectly for cohort via the number of months in which a participant 
could have made matchable deposits. The model also directly controls for membership 
in ADD’s last cohort, because—regardless of match rates—this group was hastily 
recruited to meet enrollment goals and ended up with lower savings. 
 
Third, the largest program in ADD offered a 2:1 match rate for home purchase and a 
1:1 match rate for all other uses. But the model controls for intended use, and the 
match rate is based on the participant’s “intended use” at enrollment. 
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Fourth, except in Chicago (which had two ADD programs), it was impossible for 
participants to self-select into programs based on unobserved characteristics that made 
them extra-sensitive to match rates. 
 
3.3 Estimated match-rate effects 
 
Figure 3 presents the estimated match-rate effects from the two-step model with the 
ADD data (other model results are in the Appendix). In accord with theory, higher 
match rates in the first-step Probit were associated with a greater likelihood of being a 
“saver”. Compared with a 1:1 match rate, a 2:1 match rate was associated with an 
increase in the likelihood of being a “saver” of 7.3 percentage points (p-value 0.14). 
Match rates above 2:1 were associated with an increase of 14.7 percentage points (p-
value 0.06). Just more than half of participants were “savers”, so these are large effects. 
Despite the one not-quite-significant p-value, the pattern is that higher match rates 
were associated with a greater likelihood of saving something. 
 
For “savers”, the theoretical effect of higher match rates on the level of IDA savings is 
ambiguous; either the “substitution effect” or the “fixed-goal effect” could win out. In the 
second-step Tobit with the ADD data, the move from a match rate of 1:1 to 2:1 was 
associated with an increase in “matchable savings per month” of $5.76 (p-value 0.03). 
Average “matchable savings per month” for “savers” was $28.57, this is again a large 
effect. IDA savings with match rates of more than 2:1 were not significantly different 
than with match rates of 1:1, but this may be due to the minimal within-program 
variation involving “savers” with match rates above 2:1 in ADD. 
 
Broadly, the “fixed-goal effect” seems to have dominated the “substitution effect”. For 
low-income people saving for a “lumpy” purchase, this is plausible. If the minimum 
down payment on a home is $2,000, the cost of lost matches due to not saving an 
additional $100 is the same at $1,900 as at $2,100, but participants may stop saving 
once they can buy the house, either because they need cash for closing costs or because 
the marginal utility of consumption now exceeds the opportunity cost of lost matches.  
 
IDAs are not 401(k) plans; IDA participants are poorer, and IDA match rates are 
higher (the typical match rate in 401(k)s is 0.5:1). Thus, the IDA results here have 
few—if any—implications for 401(k)s. In particular, the association of higher match 
rates with lower IDA savings does not contradict the best work on 401(k)s and its 
association of higher match rates with higher savings (Engelhardt and Kumar, 2003; 
Cunningham and Engelhardt, 2002). The IDA results may indicate, however, possible 
conflicts between the three goals of inclusion, saving, and asset accumulation. 
Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis 
11
4. Conclusion 
 
In IDAs in ADD, higher match rates were associated with a greater likelihood of saving 
something but—for “savers”—a lower level of IDA savings. Unlike work on match rates 
in 401(k) plans, this paper estimates two distinct match-rate effects and controls for 
censoring and for unobserved heterogeneity in programs and participants. 
 
In terms of the three basic goals of IDAs, higher match rates encourage inclusion 
because they make participants more likely to save something. Higher match rates also, 
however, depress IDA savings. On net, asset accumulation could rise or fall. On one 
hand, increasing the likelihood of being a “saver” increases asset accumulation. On the 
other hand, decreasing IDA savings by “savers” decreases asset accumulation. Finally, 
for a given level of IDA savings, a higher match rate increases asset accumulation. 
 
For ADD, simulations based on the regression predict that, with a match rate of 1:1, 
47.3 percent of participants would be “savers” with an average (censored) “matchable 
balance per month” of $32.69 (Figure 4). With a match rate of 2:1, 52.7 percent would 
be “savers” (an increase of 5.4 percentage points) with average “matchable savings per 
month” of $29.16 (a decrease of $3.53). Looking at all participants, average “matchable 
savings per month” would decrease by about 10 cents; the increase in the likelihood of 
being a “saver” almost exactly cancels the decrease in the level of IDA savings. Thus, 
compared with a 1:1 match rate, a 2:1 match rate increases asset accumulation per 
participant per month by almost 50 percent, from $30.92 to $46.10. 
 
What does this mean for IDAs as a possible universal, lifelong, progressive asset-
building policy? If participants in ADD do not resemble participants in a long-term, 
large-scale policy, then these results may mean little. If ADD is somewhat 
representative, however, then the results highlight trade-offs among the basic goals of 
IDAs. Higher match rates are associated with greater inclusion and increased asset 
accumulation but with decreased IDA savings per “saver” and with essentially 
unchanged IDA savings per participant. 
 
Inclusion and asset accumulation probably matter more than increased savings. Even 
though ADD participants were poor, at least some of their IDA savings were 
“reshuffled” rather than “new” (Schreiner et al., 2001). Even if all IDA savings were 
“new”, $15 per participant per month (about 1 percent of income in these low-income 
households) probably would not be a large boost to the household saving rate. 
 
In qualitative work, ADD participants say that inclusion in IDAs sparked hope and 
helped them focus on future goals (Sherraden et al., 2003). Also, preliminary results 
from the one program in ADD that randomized access to IDAs across qualified 
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applicants suggest that IDAs accelerated asset accumulation, not only for the three 
fundamental matched uses of home ownership, post-secondary education, and small-
business ownership, but also for household durables (cars, refrigerators, clothes dryers, 
and dishwashers) even though these purchases were not matched. 
 
All this argues for higher match rates. The goals of increased inclusion and asset 
accumulation—if not also increased savings—would be better served with a match rate 
of 2:1. 
 
Of course, the match rate is just one policy lever in IDA design. In particular, the 
match cap also matters. Qualitative work in ADD suggests that participants see the 
match cap not as a limit but as a goal. This fits with work in behavioral economics that 
finds that people often believe—without bothering to see if it holds for their own case—
that subsidized savings opportunities should be “maxed out” (Milligan, 2003; Thaler 
and Sunstein, 2003). In this sense, the effects of a lower match rate might be at least 
partly compensated by being coupled with a higher match cap. 
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Appendix: Variables and regression results 
This appendix presents the control variables (other than match rates) in the two-
step model and briefly discusses collateral results omitted from the main text. 
A.1 Elements of IDA design 
 The average match cap in ADD was about $41 per month ($500 per year, Figure 
5). A $1 increase in the cap was linked with $0.50 increase in IDA savings. 
 Match caps limited matchable deposits either in each year or over the lifetime of 
ADD. About half of participants had annual caps. Lifetime caps were linked with huge 
($18 per month) increases in IDA savings. Again, this is puzzling. 
 About 6 percent of ADD participants used automatic transfer to their IDA. All 
else constant, they were 17 percentage points more likely to be “savers”. 
 “Months to make matchable deposits” was represented with a set of dummies. 
Participants with more than three years to save were much more likely to be “savers”. 
 All programs in ADD required financial education. The Probit omits hours 
attended because of endogeneity; drop-outs had fewer hours, not because missing class 
caused them to drop-out but because dropping out caused them to miss class. In the 
Tobit, each additional hour of class attendance from 0 to 10 was associated with an 
increase in IDA savings of about $1.60, a very large effect. 
Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis 
18 
A.2 Intended use of matched withdrawals 
At enrollment, 48 percent of participants planned to make a matched withdrawal 
for home purchase, 16 percent for post-secondary education, 19 percent for small-
business ownership, and 17 percent for home repair, job training, or retirement saving 
(Figure 6). Those who planned for home ownership were the least likely to be “savers”, 
while those who planned for home repair were the most likely. All else constant, those 
who planned for small-business ownership had lower IDA savings. 
A.3 Participant demographics 
Four of five participants in ADD were female, and they were 7 percentage points 
more likely than men to be “savers” (Figure 7). 
In race/ethnicity, participants were African-American (47 percent), Caucasian 
(37 percent), Hispanic (9 percent), Native American (3 percent), “Other” (3 percent), 
and Asian-American (2 percent). Compared with Caucasians, Asian Americans and 
“Others” were more likely to be “savers”. Asian Americans also saved about $7 more per 
month than Caucasians, while African Americans and Native Americans saved $8 less. 
The average age in ADD was 36. Using linear splines (Smith, 1979), savings 
outcomes worsened sharply from ages 14 to 20, but they improved after that. 
Married participants (28 percent) were more likely to be “savers” than the 49 
percent who were never-married. About 28 percent were divorced or separated, and 3 
percent were widowed. 
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The average household in ADD had 1.5 adults and 1.7 children. Neither variable 
was associated with savings outcomes. 
Being in a household with other IDA participants (6 percent of cases) was not 
associated with savings outcomes. 
Being in a rural area (13 percent of cases) was not linked with savings outcomes. 
A.4 Education and employment 
 In ADD, 16 percent of participants did not finish high school, 23 percent finished 
high school, 39 percent attended college, and 22 percent had a college degree (Figure 8). 
Outcomes were generally worst for high-school drop-outs and best for college graduates. 
 About 91 percent of participants in ADD were employed or were students. 
Except for working students, employment status was not linked with savings outcomes. 
 A handful (2 percent) of ADD participants were also employees of the host 
organizations that housed the IDA programs. These participants had higher savings. 
A.5 Income and receipt of public assistance 
 About half of participants received some sort of income-tested public assistance 
at or before enrollment. People with food stamps had lower IDA savings (Figure 9). 
 Income was divided into “recurrent” and “intermittent” because its regularity 
affects saving (Deaton, 1992). For each type, splines allowed for non-linearities. More 
income—up to the kink in the spline—was generally related with greater likelihood of 
being a “saver” and higher IDA savings, although the effects were small. 
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A.6 Bank accounts 
 At enrollment, 38 percent of ADD participants had both passbook and checking 
accounts, 26 percent had only checking accounts, 12 percent had only passbooks, and 
23 percent were “unbanked” (Figure 10). Generally, those with checking accounts had 
better savings outcomes than the “unbanked” or those with only passbooks. 
 Balances in passbook and checking accounts were specified as splines. Higher 
balances—up to the kink—were usually associated with better savings outcomes. 
A.7 Assets 
 About 16 percent of participants owned a home (one-fourth of those debt-free), 
64 percent owned a car (63 percent of those debt-free), 2 percent owned land or 
property, 13 percent had financial investments, and 11 percent had small-business 
assets (Figure 11). In general, owners were more likely to be “savers”, especially if they 
were debt-free. For the level of IDA savings, mortgage-free home owners and small-
business owners saved more than others. 
A.8 Debts 
 About 17 percent of participants had student loans, 18 percent informal debts, 28 
percent late household bills, 18 percent late medical bills, and 33 percent credit-card 
debt (Figure 12). Credit-card debt was linked with a lower probability of being a 
“saver”, overdue bills with lower IDA savings, and informal debts with higher savings. 
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A.9 Insurance coverage 
 In ADD, 61 percent of participants had health insurance, and 39 percent had life 
insurance (Figure 13). Those with life insurance were less likely to be “savers”. 
A.10 Enrollment and referrals 
 About 41 percent of participants had been clients of the host organization that 
housed the IDA program (Figure 14). This was not linked with savings outcomes. The 
30 percent who were referred to the IDA program by a partner organization were less 
likely to be “savers”. Finally, the 40 percent of participants who opened IDAs in the last 
six months of enrollment saved about $3 less per month. 
A.10 Program fixed effects 
 Figure 15 reports program fixed effects. There were wide differences in savings 
outcomes that were associated with specific programs but not with other regressors. 
A.10 Intercepts, zero-order dummies, and fit 
 Figure 16 reports regression intercepts, zero-order dummies, and measures of fit. 
For variables with missing values, a parallel zero-order dummy was set to unity (1) 
when the original variable was missing, and zero otherwise. Then the missing value was 
changed to zero, and both variables were included in the regression. In terms of the 
other estimated coefficients, this is equivalent to replacing missing values with the 
variable’s mean (Greene, 1993). 
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Figure 1: Savings outcomes in ADD, match rates, 
match caps, and censoring 
Measure All 1:1 2:1 >2:1
Participants:
All (number) 2,350 654 1,137 559
All (%) 100 28 48 24
"Savers" (Matchable balances =>$100):
"Savers" (number) 1,243 367 572 304
"Savers" (% participants, given a match rate) 53 56 50 54
Matchable savings ($) 990 1,357 887 739
Share of income saved in IDAs (%) 2.7 3.4 2.4 2.3
Matchable savings per month ($) 28.57 36.91 26.67 22.07
Match cap 1,442 2,060 1,325 917
Months eligible for matchable deposits 34.4 36.6 33.4 33.5
Share censored at =>95% of match cap (%) 42 27 44 57
Note: T-tests for differences in means between all pairs have p<0.10, except
2:1 versus >2:1 for share of "Savers", months eligible, and saving rate.
Match rate
For "Savers" only:
Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis 
23
Figure 2: Match-rate variation between and within programs in ADD 
 
Program All 1:1 2:1 >2:1 All 1:1 2:1 >2:1
ADVOCAP 82 0 82 0 58 0 58 0
Alternatives FCU 91 0 0 91 73 0 0 73
Bay Area 239 0 239 0 151 0 151 0
CAAB 142 1 37 104 72 1 15 56
CAPTC Large-scale 456 216 240 0 211 144 67 0
CAPTC Small-scale 163 105 58 0 95 81 14 0
CVCAC 154 61 69 24 105 38 49 18
Foundation Communities 125 1 119 5 53 0 53 0
Heart of America 91 0 90 1 68 0 68 0
MACED 65 16 15 34 42 0 11 31
Mercy Corps 118 118 0 0 54 54 0 0
Near Eastside 190 6 3 181 87 0 1 86
Shorebank 203 129 74 0 88 49 39 0
WSEP 231 1 111 119 86 0 46 40
All ADD: 2350 654 1137 559 1243 367 572 304
"Savers"All participants
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Figure 3: Estimated match-rate effects in IDAs in ADD 
Independent variable Mean ∆% pts. p-value Mean ∆$ p-value
Match rate
    1:1 0.28 0.21
    2:1 0.48 +7.3 0.14 0.46 –5.76 0.03
    >2:1 0.24 +14.7 0.06 0.24 –0.48 0.92
Note: All tables derived from a single "Heckit"-type selection specification with two steps.
The "lambda" selection term was statistically zero (p = 0.95), so the two steps were estimated separately.
The first step was a Probit (n=2,350, k=105) for the likelihood of being a "saver".
The second step was a Tobit (n=1,233, k=111) for "matchable savings per month" for "savers".
Means taken over non-missing observations.
Net deposits/monthProb.(Net deposits=>$100)
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Figure 4: Simulated changes in inclusion, IDA 
savings, and asset accumulation in ADD as 
match rates move from 1:1 to 2:1 
Change
Measure 1:1 2:1 1:1 to 2:1
"Savers" (%) 47.3 52.7 5.4
"Matchable savings per month" for "savers" ($) 32.69 29.16 -3.53
"Matchable savings per month" per participant ($) 15.46 15.37 -0.10
Asset accumulation per month per participant ($) 30.92 46.10 15.18
Source: Simulations with ADD data and estimates from two-step model.
Match rate
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Figure 5: Elements of IDA design 
Independent variable Mean ∆% pts. p-value Mean ∆$ p-value
Match cap
    Limit on matchable deposits ($/month) 41 +0.1 0.19 42 +0.50 0.01
Match-cap structure
    Annual 0.52
    Lifetime 0.48 –6.9 0.44 0.50 +18.18 0.01
Use of automatic transfer to IDA
    No 0.94 0.93
    Yes 0.06 +17.3 0.01 0.07 +1.26 0.58
Months to make matchable deposits
    24 or less 0.25 0.22
    25 to 35 0.19 +7.4 0.36 0.20 –2.51 0.55
    36 0.28 +2.4 0.81 0.25 –5.10 0.32
    37 or more 0.28 +16.4 0.06 0.33 –5.58 0.22
Hours of general financial education
    Zero 0.09
    More than zero 0.91 –0.04 0.99
    1 to 10 (spline) 9.0 +1.59 0.01
    10 to 20 (spline) 2.3 –0.35 0.24
    20 to 30 (spline) 0.4 +0.59 0.21
Note: All tables derived from a single "Heckit"-type selection specification with two steps.
The "lambda" selection term was statistically zero (p = 0.95), so the two steps were estimated separately.
The first step was a Probit (n=2,350, k=105) for the likelihood of being a "saver".
The second step was a Tobit (n=1,233, k=111) for "matchable savings per month" for "savers".
Means taken over non-missing observations.
Prob.(Net deposits=>$100) Net deposits/month
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Figure 6: Intended use of match withdrawal as recorded at enrollment 
Independent variable Mean ∆% pts. p-value Mean ∆$ p-value
Intended use of matched withdrawal
    Home purchase 0.48 0.43
    Home repair 0.09 +35.5 0.01 0.13 +3.47 0.20
    Post-secondary education 0.16 +17.3 0.01 0.18 –2.06 0.30
    Job training 0.02 +4.3 0.62 0.02 –5.60 0.24
    Retirement 0.06 +18.1 0.01 0.07 –0.28 0.92
    Small-business ownership 0.19 +15.6 0.01 0.22 –3.96 0.04
Note: All tables derived from a single "Heckit"-type selection specification with two steps.
The "lambda" selection term was statistically zero (p = 0.95), so the two steps were estimated separately.
The first step was a Probit (n=2,350, k=105) for the likelihood of being a "saver".
The second step was a Tobit (n=1,233, k=111) for "matchable savings per month" for "savers".
Means taken over non-missing observations.
Prob.(Net deposits=>$100) Net deposits/month
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Figure 7: Participant demographics 
I n d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e M e a n ∆ %  p t s . p - v a lu e M e a n ∆ $ p - v a lu e
G e n d e r
    M a l e 0 . 2 0 0 . 2 1
    F e m a l e 0 . 8 0 + 6 . 9 0 . 0 4 0 . 7 9 + 0 . 1 4 0 . 9 3
R a c e / E t h n i c i t y
    C a u c a s i a n 0 . 3 7 0 . 4 4
    A f r i c a n  A m e r i c a n 0 . 4 7 – 2 . 7 0 . 4 4 0 . 3 9 – 7 . 9 3 0 . 0 1
    A s i a n  A m e r i c a n 0 . 0 2 + 1 9 . 4 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 3 + 6 . 8 6 0 . 1 0
    H i s p a n i c 0 . 0 9 + 8 . 1 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 0 – 0 . 4 1 0 . 8 7
    N a t i v e  A m e r i c a n 0 . 0 3 – 5 . 3 0 . 4 7 0 . 0 2 – 7 . 9 1 0 . 0 4
    O t h e r  r a c e / e t h n i c i t y 0 . 0 3 + 1 4 . 2 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 3 + 0 . 5 9 0 . 8 7
A g e
    1 4  t o  2 0  ( s p l i n e ) 5 . 9 – 7 . 2 0 . 0 1 5 . 9 – 2 . 3 2 0 . 0 3
    2 0  t o  7 0  ( s p l i n e ) 1 6 + 0 . 5 0 . 0 1 1 7 + 0 . 2 0 0 . 0 1
M a r i t a l  s t a t u s
    N e v e r -m a r r i e d 0 . 4 9 0 . 3 9
    M a r r i e d 0 . 2 3 + 8 . 1 0 . 0 4 0 . 2 7 – 0 . 2 2 0 . 9 1
    D iv o r c e d  o r  s e p a r a t e d 0 . 2 8 + 1 . 0 0 . 7 6 0 . 3 0 – 1 . 0 7 0 . 5 0
    W id o w e d 0 . 0 3 + 3 . 1 0 . 7 3 0 . 0 4 – 8 . 4 2 0 . 0 3
H o u s e h o l d  c o m p o s i t i o n
    A d u l t s  ( 1 8  o r  o l d e r ) 1 . 5 + 2 . 4 0 . 2 5 1 . 5 – 0 . 2 7 0 . 8 0
    C h i l d r e n  ( 1 7  o r  y o u n g e r ) 1 . 7 – 0 . 8 0 . 3 7 1 . 7 – 0 . 1 3 0 . 7 9
M u l t i p l e  I D A  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  h o u s e h o ld
    N o 0 . 9 4 0 . 9 3
    Y e s 0 . 0 6 – 3 . 9 0 . 4 6 0 . 0 7 + 1 . 0 2 0 . 7 0
L o c a t i o n  o f  r e s i d e n c e
    U r b a n  ( p o p .  2 , 5 0 0  o r  m o r e ) 0 . 8 7 0 . 8 4
    R u r a l  ( p o p .  2 , 5 0 0  o r  l e s s ) 0 . 1 3 + 1 . 7 0 . 7 6 0 . 1 6 – 0 . 6 8 0 . 8 0
N o t e :  A l l  t a b l e s  d e r i v e d  f r o m  a  s i n g l e  " H e c k i t " - t y p e  s e l e c t i o n  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  w i t h  t w o  s t e p s .
T h e  " l a m b d a "  s e l e c t i o n  t e r m  w a s  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  z e r o  ( p  =  0 . 9 5 ) ,  s o  t h e  t w o  s t e p s  w e r e  e s t im a t e d  s e p a r a t e l y .
T h e  f i r s t  s t e p  w a s  a  P r o b i t  ( n = 2 , 3 5 0 ,  k = 1 0 5 )  f o r  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  b e i n g  a  " s a v e r " .
T h e  s e c o n d  s t e p  w a s  a  T o b i t  ( n = 1 , 2 3 3 ,  k = 1 1 1 )  f o r  " m a t c h a b l e  s a v in g s  p e r  m o n t h "  f o r  " s a v e r s " .
M e a n s  t a k e n  o v e r  n o n -m i s s i n g  o b s e r v a t i o n s .
P r o b . ( N e t  d e p o s i t s = > $ 1 0 0 ) N e t  d e p o s i t s / m o n t h
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Figure 8: Education and employment status 
Independent variable Mean ∆% pts. p-value Mean ∆$ p-value
Education
    Did not complete high school 0.16 0.45
    Completed high school or GED 0.23 +5.0 0.22 0.21 –0.04 0.99
    Attended college but did not graduate 0.39 +6.5 0.10 0.38 +1.14 0.61
    Graduated 2-year college 0.04 +4.6 0.54 0.03 –5.87 0.13
    Graduated college, 2-year/4-year unknown 0.11 +18.5 0.01 0.14 +5.52 0.04
    Graduated 4-year college 0.07 +21.1 0.01 0.10 +4.94 0.09
Employment
    Unemployed 0.05 0.13
    Homemaker, retired, or disabled 0.04 +1.8 0.82 0.05 –4.91 0.21
    Student, not working 0.06 –6.7 0.38 0.04 +2.47 0.58
    Student, also working 0.03 +15.0 0.09 0.03 +4.16 0.35
    Employed part-time 0.23 +6.3 0.29 0.23 +1.80 0.57
    Employed full-time 0.59 +6.7 0.25 0.60 –2.10 0.50
Employee of host organization
    No 0.98 0.97
    Yes 0.02 +3.4 0.68 0.03 +6.92 0.10
Note: All tables derived from a single "Heckit"-type selection specification with two steps.
The "lambda" selection term was statistically zero (p = 0.95), so the two steps were estimated separately.
The first step was a Probit (n=2,350, k=105) for the likelihood of being a "saver".
The second step was a Tobit (n=1,233, k=111) for "matchable savings per month" for "savers".
Means taken over non-missing observations.
Prob.(Net deposits=>$100) Net deposits/month
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Figure 9: Income and receipt of public assistance 
Independent variable Mean ∆% pts. p-value Mean ∆$ p-value
AFDC or TANF before enrollment
    No 0.62 0.64
    Yes 0.38 +1.5 0.63 0.36 –0.36 0.80
AFDC or TANF at enrollment
    No 0.90 0.93
    Yes 0.10 –4.2 0.40 0.07 +3.06 0.27
SSI/SSDI at enrollment
    No 0.89 0.89
    Yes 0.11 +2.5 0.62 0.11 +2.94 0.27
Food stamps at enrollment
    No 0.83 0.84
    Yes 0.17 +5.0 0.24 0 0.16 –5.01 0.03
Recurrent income (monthly $)
    0 to $1,500 (spline) 1,000 –0.00003 0.35 990 +0.0033 0.07
    $1,500 to $3,000 (spline) 155 +0.00003 0.47 165 –0.0002 0.92
Intermittent income (monthly $)
    0 to $2,000 (spline) 210 +0.00007 0.09 250 +0.0043 0.02
    $2,000 to $3,000 (spline) 6 +0.00015 0.48 8 –0.0108 0.21
Note: All tables derived from a single "Heckit"-type selection specification with two steps.
The "lambda" selection term was statistically zero (p = 0.95), so the two steps were estimated separately.
The first step was a Probit (n=2,350, k=105) for the likelihood of being a "saver".
The second step was a Tobit (n=1,233, k=111) for "matchable savings per month" for "savers".
Means taken over non-missing observations.
Prob.(Net deposits=>$100) Net deposits/month
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Figure 10: Bank accounts 
Independent variable Mean ∆% pts. p-value Mean ∆$ p-value
Passbook and checking accounts
    Both passbook and checkbook 0.38 0.45
    Checking only 0.26 +5.1 0.18 0.30 +2.81 0.12
    Passbook only 0.12 –12.8 0.01 0.10 –3.24 0.14
    Unbanked (no passbook, no checking) 0.23 –7.9 0.06 0.15 +0.92 0.68
Passbook savings balance ($)
    0 to $400 (spline) 94 +0.00049 0.01 113 +0.0197 0.01
    $400 to $3,000 (spline) 134 –0.00007 0.03 175 +0.0024 0.10
Checking balance ($)
    0 to $1,500 (spline) 198 +0.00012 0.01 260 –0.0012 0.58
    $1,500 to $3,000 (spline) 21 –0.00009 0.33 29 +0.0043 0.29
Note: All tables derived from a single "Heckit"-type selection specification with two steps.
The "lambda" selection term was statistically zero (p = 0.95), so the two steps were estimated separately.
The first step was a Probit (n=2,350, k=105) for the likelihood of being a "saver".
The second step was a Tobit (n=1,233, k=111) for "matchable savings per month" for "savers".
Means taken over non-missing observations.
Prob.(Net deposits=>$100) Net deposits/month
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Figure 11: Assets 
Independent variable Mean ∆% pts. p-value Mean ∆$ p-value
Home ownership
    Renter 0.84 0.78
    Owned with mortgage 0.12 +9.3 0.05 0.17 +2.19 0.26
    Owned free and clear 0.04 +3.5 0.61 0.05 +11.68 0.01
Car ownership
    None 0.36 0.26
    Owned with loan 0.24 +4.1 0.24 0.26 –0.85 0.65
    Owned free and clear 0.40 +11.0 0.01 0.48 +1.49 0.35
Land or property ownership
    None 0.98 0.97
    Owned with mortgage 0.01 +54.7 0.07 0.01 –4.74 0.65
    Owned free and clear 0.01 +68.0 0.02 0.02 –11.17 0.37
Financial investments
    No 0.87 0.84
    Yes 0.13 +13.1 0.01 0.16 –0.77 0.66
Small-business ownership
    No 0.89 0.86
    Yes 0.11 –0.6 0.91 0.14 +4.16 0.06
Note: All tables derived from a single "Heckit"-type selection specification with two steps.
The "lambda" selection term was statistically zero (p = 0.95), so the two steps were estimated separately.
The first step was a Probit (n=2,350, k=105) for the likelihood of being a "saver".
The second step was a Tobit (n=1,233, k=111) for "matchable savings per month" for "savers".
Means taken over non-missing observations.
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Figure 12: Debts 
Independent variable Mean ∆% pts. p-value Mean ∆$ p-value
Student loans
    No 0.83 0.84
    Yes 0.17 +3.2 0.37 0.16 +2.67 0.15
Informal loans from family or friends
    No 0.82 0.82
    Yes 0.18 –4.0 0.23 0.18 +3.38 0.04
Debt as overdue household bills
    No 0.72 0.75
    Yes 0.28 –1.3 0.64 0.25 –3.67 0.01
Debt as overdue medical bills
    No 0.82 0.84
    Yes 0.18 –3.9 0.24 0.16 –2.98 0.09
Credit-card debt
    No 0.67 0.67
    Yes 0.33 –4.7 0.10 0.33 +0.42 0.76
Note: All tables derived from a single "Heckit"-type selection specification with two steps.
The "lambda" selection term was statistically zero (p = 0.95), so the two steps were estimated separately.
The first step was a Probit (n=2,350, k=105) for the likelihood of being a "saver".
The second step was a Tobit (n=1,233, k=111) for "matchable savings per month" for "savers".
Means taken over non-missing observations.
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Figure 13: Insurance coverage 
Independent variable Mean ∆% pts. p-value Mean ∆$ p-value
Health insurance
    No 0.39 0.33
    Yes 0.61 +6.4 0.16 0.67 +0.10 0.97
Life insurance
    No 0.61 0.59
    Yes 0.39 –8.1 0.07 0.41 –1.51 0.50
Note: All tables derived from a single "Heckit"-type selection specification with two steps.
The "lambda" selection term was statistically zero (p = 0.95), so the two steps were estimated separately.
The first step was a Probit (n=2,350, k=105) for the likelihood of being a "saver".
The second step was a Tobit (n=1,233, k=111) for "matchable savings per month" for "savers".
Means taken over non-missing observations.
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Figure 14: Enrollment and referral 
Independent variable Mean ∆% pts. p-value Mean ∆$ p-value
Previous relationship with IDA host organization
    No 0.70 0.73
    Yes 0.41 –3.5 0.23 0.41 –0.32 0.82
Referred by a partner organization
    No 0.70 0.73
    Yes 0.30 –5.9 0.10 0.27 –1.14 0.51
Enrolled in last six months possible
    No 0.58 0.61
    Yes 0.42 –1.6 0.63 0.39 –3.05 0.08
Note: All tables derived from a single "Heckit"-type selection specification with two steps.
The "lambda" selection term was statistically zero (p = 0.95), so the two steps were estimated separately.
The first step was a Probit (n=2,350, k=105) for the likelihood of being a "saver".
The second step was a Tobit (n=1,233, k=111) for "matchable savings per month" for "savers".
Means taken over non-missing observations.
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Figure 15: Program fixed effects 
Independent variable Mean ∆% pts. p-value Mean ∆$ p-value
Program and AFIA status
    Foundation Communities 0.05 –12.7 0.21 0.04 –2.68 0.63
    WSEP 0.07 –6.0 0.75 0.04 –19.48 0.04
    WSEP AFIA 0.03 –3.5 0.86 0.02 –29.44 0.01
    MACED 0.03 –0.0 0.99 0.03 –3.78 0.72
    CAPTC Large-Scale 0.19 0.30
    Mercy Corps 0.05 +0.7 0.94 0.04 –9.12 0.09
    CAPTC Small-Scale 0.07 +7.1 0.43 0.08 –10.61 0.02
    Near Eastside 0.08 +8.3 0.54 0.07 –7.93 0.29
    CVCAC AFIA 0.02 +10.4 0.51 0.03 +10.66 0.13
    Shorebank 0.09 +19.2 0.08 0.08 –4.07 0.47
    ADVOCAP 0.03 +19.6 0.29 0.04 –9.19 0.33
    Heart of America 0.04 +30.5 0.04 0.06 –22.10 0.01
    CVCAC 0.07 +31.9 0.01 0.09 –17.51 0.01
    Alternatives FCU 0.04 +33.1 0.04 0.06 –14.85 0.08
    CAAB 0.04 +46.0 0.01 0.03 –22.59 0.07
    Bay Area 0.10 +64.8 0.01 0.12 –16.90 0.09
    CAAB AFIA 0.02 +73.8 0.01 0.03 –19.54 0.12
Note: All tables derived from a single "Heckit"-type selection specification with two steps.
The "lambda" selection term was statistically zero (p = 0.95), so the two steps were estimated separately.
The first step was a Probit (n=2,350, k=105) for the likelihood of being a "saver".
The second step was a Tobit (n=1,233, k=111) for "matchable savings per month" for "savers".
Means taken over non-missing observations.
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Figure 16: Intercept, zero-order regression dummies, and fit 
Independent variable Mean ∆% pts. p-value Mean ∆$ p-value
Regression constant
    Intercept 1.0 –25.3 0.18 1.0 +14.44 0.16
Zero-order regression dummies
    Use of automatic transfer 0.06 –26.8 0.01 0.03 –3.27 0.50
    Marital status 0.01 +18.3 0.26 0.01 +7.12 0.28
    Number of children 0.00 +34.7 0.14 0.00 +3.61 0.65
    Existing relationship with host org. 0.06 –0.1 0.99 0.03 –13.96 0.05
    Referred by partner org. 0.21 –43.5 0.01 0.21 +8.36 0.24
    AFDC or TANF before enrollment 0.01 –11.9 0.45 0.01 –6.58 0.44
    Received SSI at enrollment 0.34 +22.3 0.02 0.37 +3.47 0.46
    Received food stamps at enrollment 0.35 +5.8 0.54 0.38 +0.12 0.98
    Recurrent income 0.02 –57.7 0.02 0.03 +11.77 0.31
    Passbook balances 0.03 +12.7 0.12 0.03 +3.55 0.38
    Checking balances 0.04 –14.8 0.03 0.04 –0.75 0.83
    Financial investments 0.00 +28.3 0.28 0.00 –1.08 0.92
    Car 0.00 –9.5 0.78 0.00 +11.70 0.50
    Presence of some type of debt 0.01 +20.5 0.32 0.01 +7.29 0.40
    Insurance coverage 0.62 –13.1 0.01 0.61 –0.22 0.92
    Variables with rare missings 0.01 –3.8 0.79 0.01 –5.10 0.53
    Intermittent income 0.00 +7.27 0.50
    General financial education 0.06 +15.47 0.12
Regression fit
–2 x Log-likelihood 2465.64 6702.92
Share (%) of pairs correctly predicted (c) 81.2
Note: All tables derived from a single "Heckit"-type selection specification with two steps.
The "lambda" selection term was statistically zero (p = 0.95), so the two steps were estimated separately.
The first step was a Probit (n=2,350, k=105) for the likelihood of being a "saver".
The second step was a Tobit (n=1,233, k=111) for "matchable savings per month" for "savers".
Means taken over non-missing observations.
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